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Abstract 
This article assesses the implementation of migration policy in Kazakhstan over the past twenty 
years, focusing on the results attained through attempts to reverse Kazakhstan’s net negative 
migration trends. Our analysis traces the impact of socio-economic conditions on migration 
processes, using the example of the Central Asian and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 
member states including Kazakhstan. Consideration of further factors, such as ethnic repatriation, 
also points to the uphill battle that Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries face in 
maintaining their skilled workforce and encouraging high skilled migrants to come into the 
country. The results of the analysis reveal the causes of the low level of efficiency in the Republic 
of Kazakhstan’s migration policy. Undocumented workers continue to play a major role in 
industries outside of the highly skilled and household workers, yet they are often denied their 
labor and human rights. The authors propose new approaches in the regulation of migration 
activities aimed at improving the quality of life of prospective migrants, improving the socio- 
economic conditions of the native population, and mitigating the further outflow of highly 
qualified specialists from the country. These approaches recognize that solutions must not only 
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address barriers to economic success in Kazakhstan, but also must inspire confidence in 
Kazakhstan’s improving economic situation even when per capita income remains relatively low.  
 
Keywords: migration policy, government regulation, repatriates, the external migration balance. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Global migration flows have changed dramatically in structure and volume 
over the past decade. In 2017, according to the UN, 258 million people or 3.4 % 
of the world population engaged in migration. The majority of these migrants 
were born in Asia (106 million), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean 
(38 million). Over the past twenty years, the number of migrants has almost 
doubled, driven in part by the rapid population growth in the third world and the 
precarious conditions in many communities.
1
 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) are home to developing and high-income 
countries, and here the number of international migrants reached 30.4 million in 
2013. Of those, 16.4 million were claimed by developing countries such as Russia 
(11.9), Ukraine (5.1 million), Kazakhstan (3.5 million), and Turkey (1.9 million).
2
 
Remittances are the main driving force behind this movement, and the 
economy of many countries depends on funds sent by migrant workers from 
abroad. Moreover, remittances represent a large portion of countries’ GDP. For 
instance, Ukraine, with $9.3 billion, remains the largest recipient of remittances, 
followed by Tajikistan with $4.1 billion, and Romania with $3.6 
billion.  Remittances represent 4.8 percent of GDP in Ukraine, 48 percent of 
GDP in Tajikistan, 31 percent of GDP in Kyrgyzstan, and 24.5 percent of GDP 
in Moldova.
3
 
There are both socioeconomic and policy realities that encourage workers 
from Central Asian countries with an excessive labor supply and low wages to 
migrate to Russia and Kazakhstan. These two countries, whose economic 
growth has been driven by revenues from oil exports, benefit economically from 
the presence of cheap migrant workers. Even though visa-free agreements exist 
between former Soviet Republics, most Central Asian migrants work illegally in 
these countries. According to Russia’s Federal Migration Service, in 2013 three 
million foreigners entered Russia to work illegally.
4
 Kazakhstan is no exception. 
                                               
1 “World Migration Report 2020,” International Organization for Migration, accessed March 
15, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wmr_2020.pdf. 
2  “Migration and Remittance Flows in Europe and Central Asia: Recent Trends and 
Outlook, 2013-2016,” World Bank, accessed March 15, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/ 
en/news/feature/2013/10/02/migration-and-remittance-flows-in-europe-and-central-asia-
recent-trends-and-outlook-2013-2016. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid. 
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Between 2016 and 2018, more than 5.6 million foreign citizens entered the 
country, with more than 90% of them being citizens of the CIS (mainly 
Uzbekistan, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan). The number of migrants from non-CIS 
countries is also increasing, reaching 620,000 people in 2019. These are mostly 
citizens of Turkey and China.
5
 Altogether, from 300,000 up to 1.5 million 
migrants work illegally in Kazakhstan.
6
  
Migrant workers from Central Asia, representing unskilled and illegal 
labor, work in extremely severe conditions having much lower salaries as 
compared to legal migrants. They are deprived of rights and because of their 
legal status they can be detained and deported by police at any time. This 
situation has attracted much attention from the international community. In 
order to solve the problems of labor migration in Central Asia, the International 
Organization for Migration, UN Women and the World Bank, with the support 
of the UK Government, have been implementing a regional program on 
migration in Central Asia since 2007, which is aimed at improving the socio-
economic conditions of migrants and reducing poverty. The main participants of 
this program are Russia and Kazakhstan as migration destinations, and 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as migration sources.  
Today, the foundations of state labor migration policy in Kazakhstan are 
formulated in the “Concept of the Migration Policy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan”, approved by the Decree of the Government dated September 5, 
2000, N 1346. This document is in turn based on the long-term “Kazakhstan-
2030” strategy of national socio-economic development, reflecting state priorities 
in the field of population migration.
7
 
The Concept states that the migration policy of Kazakhstan 
is based on the principles of respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, 
enshrined in the Constitution of Kazakhstan and embodied in other normative acts 
and international treaties to which Kazakhstan is a party. It prohibits 
discrimination based on race, language, religion, gender, ethnic and social 
origin, views, political affiliation, property status, or for any other reason.  
The general legislative framework for the implementation of migration 
policy in Kazakhstan was established by the Law of July 22, 2011, “On Migration 
of the Population,” where labor migration is defined as “the temporary movement 
of individuals from other states to the Republic of Kazakhstan and from the 
                                               
5  “Kazakhstan tries to protect itself from illegal migrants,” Forbes.Kz, April 16, 2018, 
https://forbes.kz//process/resources/kazahstan_pyitaetsya_zaschititsya_ot_nelegalnyih_mi
grantov/. 
6  “Documents and Statistics,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, accessed March 15, 2020,  https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
7  “Concept of the Migration Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection of Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, accessed March 15, 2020, 
https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
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Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as within the state for labor activity.” The Law 
also creates grounds for the introduction of licensing procedures for attracting 
foreign labor, along with permits issued by local executive bodies. Foreign 
citizens carrying out labor activities without permission are to be expelled from 
the country.
8
 
The Government Decision of June 19, 2001 No. 836 set in place the basic 
legal framework for attracting and contracting foreign labor to come to 
Kazakhstan.
9
 In the following years, the rules have been repeatedly changed, but 
the procedures and conditions for issuing permits to attract foreign workers 
remain similar to the present day. 
The Law on Migration does not contain detailed provisions regarding the 
rights of migrant workers and concerning the differentiation between regulated 
vs. unregulated status. Basic principles determining the legal status of foreign 
citizens and stateless persons residing in Kazakhstan are enshrined in paragraph 4 
of Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. According to this 
constitutional provision, foreigners enjoy rights and freedoms in the country, and 
bear the obligations established for citizens of the country, unless otherwise 
provided for by the Constitution, laws and international treaties. 
This paper aims to analyze how the provisions of the Concept affect the 
migration situation of the country. How has Kazakhstan’s migration policy 
changed over the years since the implementation of the Concept?  This study is a 
preliminary step toward answering this question. In order to identify the causal 
relationship of negative manifestations in this area, the study applies a 
retrospective analysis of the history of migration policy in Kazakhstan. It 
conducts an analysis of basic indicators, i.e., net balance of migration, 
remittances, and government quotas for attracting foreign labor and the 
proportion of qualified specialists in their various compositions, all of which are 
used in international official statistics to assess migration policy. At the same 
time, the method of analysis of the level of socio-economic development of the 
country, on which migration flows largely depend, is used. Here the main criteria 
are the level of monetary income of the population, average wages, and the 
number of social benefits. 
 
 
                                               
8  “On Migration of the Population,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, accessed March 15, 2020, https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
9  “On approval of the Rules for establishing quotas for engagement of foreign labor force in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan and its distribution among regions of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, identifying persons whose work does not require permission from local 
executive bodies to attract foreign labor, and recognizing as declared to be no longer in 
force of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection of Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Resolution of the Government of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 802 dated December 15, 2016, https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
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Literature Review 
 
According to scholars, the migration process in Kazakhstan differs across 
time and across the factors that impact on migration decisions of people. It can 
be studied from various perspectives.
10
 The first dimension typically mentioned 
by scholars is ethnicity and the willingness to move back to the country of 
origin. Following the collapse of the USSR, many ethnic groups that had 
previously been forbidden from migration took advantage of the new situation 
and left Kazakhstan, their numbers far outweighing any migration into the 
country in the years immediately after independence.
11
 This was driven by 
ethnic Germans and the nationalities of Slavic origin returning to their ethnic-
origin countries.
12
 Zhaksybayeva and Nurzhanova (2018) argue that the 
artificial separation of ethnic groups and a general lack of incentives to stay in 
Kazakhstan were major factors driving this type of migration.
13
  
Indeed, a desire for ethnic unity, all else being equal, is a recognized 
impetus for the movement of peoples.
14
 On a more individual scale, reactivated 
or newly formed connections on the level of family and friends in other 
countries have also served as a significant motivation and pathway for 
migration.
15
 
The sociopolitical reality of Kazakhstan has also influenced migration. 
Linguistic shifts, particularly in the rise of Kazakh language schools over Russian 
language schools, have contributed to stress and consequent migration trends within 
                                               
10  Nurtay, Mustafayev.  “Migration process in Kazakhstan,” / PARAGRAF, (2006): 101-107. 
11  Kenzhegul, Nurumbetova. “Migration of Kazakh population in the beginning of 90s,” / E-
HISTORY.KZ, (2013), accessed March 15, 2020, https://e-history.kz/ru/seo-
materials/show/29021/. 
12  Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, “Migration in the post-Soviet space,” RAND, Center for 
Ethnopolitical and Research (1996): 23-48; Yuri Andrienko and Sergei Guriev,  
“Understanding migration in Russia. Designing of internal and external model of 
transition for population of Russian Federation” (World Bank Policy Note, 2005). 
13  Nurlyaiym Zhaksybayeva andSaltanat Nurzhanova, “The Migration Response to the 
Economic Factors: Lessons from Kazakhstan,” Trade policy, no 8 (2016): 101-124, ISSN 
2499-9415. 
14  Dinesh Bhugra and Mattew A Becker, “Migration, cultural bereavement and cultural 
identity,” World Psychiatry, no 1 (February 2005): 18-24; Piesse Mervyn, “Factors 
Influencing Migration and Population Movements” (Strategic analysis paper, Independent 
Strategic Analysis of Australia’s Global Interests, 2014). 
15  Zayonchkovskaya, “Migration in the post-Soviet space,” 23-48; Timothy Heleniak, “The 
2002 Census in Russia: Preliminary Results,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, no 6 
(May 2013): 430-442, DOI: 10.2747/1538-7216.44.6.430; Yuri Andrienko and Sergei 
Guriev,  “Understanding migration in Russia. Designing of internal and external model of 
transition for population of Russian Federation” (World Bank Policy Note, 2005); Jan 
Fidrmuc, “Migration and regional adjustment to asymmetric shocks in transition 
economies,” Journal of Comparative Economics, no 2 (2004): 230-247. 
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the non-Kazakh ethnicities of the country.
16
 As migration crested in 1994, nearly 
500,000 Kazakhstani citizens departed from the country to Russia.
17
 
The economic transition was another key factor driving migration in 
Kazakhstan. The early 1990s were years of crisis, with high levels of 
unemployment.
18
 These economic factors were highly significant in 
strengthening existing trends.
19
 
There have been multiple studies showing how widespread inability to 
find satisfactory jobs, as well as the poor living standards afforded by available 
salaries, influenced migration in Kazakhstan.
20
 This was particularly the case 
for educated professionals, and their subsequent exit from the country in the 
form of migration had a multiplying negative factor as it grew.
21
 In the twelve 
years following independence, this brain drain was estimated to have cost the 
Kazakhstani economy US$125 billion.
22
 
 Remittances, the sending of money across borders to support kin, is an 
influential factor in migration. According to the World Bank, there were $542 
billion in remittances transferred in 2013.
23
 Since this count only includes 
“officially recorded” remittances, it is plausible that the total global remittances 
                                               
16  Irina Yerofeyeva, “Regionaljnyi aspect slavyanskoi migratsii iz Kazakhstana (na primere 
SKO i VKO) (Regional aspects of Slavic migration from Kazakhstan on the basis of 
examples from North Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan provinces),” Natalis, Moscow 
(2012): 154–179; Galina Vitkovskaya, “Forced migrants from newly independent states 
on the Russian labor market” (Scientific reports of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 1998): 
30-70; Natalya Shulga, “The Great Migration: returnees, refugees, labor migrants” 
Institute of Sociology of the NAS, 2002): 700; Yuri Andrienko, Sergei Guriev,  
Understanding migration in Russia. Designing of internal and external model of transition 
for population of Russian Federation” (World Bank Policy Note, 2005). 
17  Kenzhegul, Nurumbetova. “Migration of Kazakh population in the beginning of 90s.” E-
HISTORY.KZ, (2013), accessed March 15, 2020, https://e-history.kz/ru/seo-
materials/show/29021/. 
18  Zhaksybayeva and Nurzhanova, “The Migration Response.” 
19  Charles Becker, Erbolat Musabek, Ai-Gul Seitenova, and Dina Urzhumova, “The 
migration response to economic shock: lessons from Kazakhstan,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Elsevier, no 1 (2005): 107-132; Erzhan Zhatkanbayev et al., 
“The Impact of Globalization on Brain Drain in Developing Countries,” Procedia - Social 
and Behavioral Sciences, no 47 (2012): 1490-1494; Zhaksybayeva and Nurzhanova, “The 
Migration Response.” 
20  Zhaksybayeva and Nurzhanova, “The Migration Response.” 
21  Wilbur Zelinsky, “The hypothesis of human transition,” Geographical Review, no 2 
(April 1971): 219-249; Koichi Hamada, “Taxing the brain drain: A global point of view,” 
in The New International Order, ed. Jagdish Bhagwati (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 
1977), 135; Valentina Bosetti, Cristina Cattaneo and Elena Verdolini, “Migration of 
skilled workers and innovation: A European Perspective,” Journal of International 
Economics, no 2 (2015): 311-322; Lucas Stanczyk, “Managing skilled migration,” Ethics 
& Global Politics, no 1, DOI: 10.3402/egp.v9.33502. 
22  Zhatkanbayev et al., “The Impact of Globalization.” 
23  “Migration and Remittance Flows.” World Bank. 
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are even larger. It is not clear within the literature whether remittances 
encourage or discourage migration overall. It has been argued that extremely 
low and very high levels of remittance discourage migration: low levels of 
remittance send a negative economic signal, while high levels reduce the need 
to migrate in the first place.
24
  
It is not simply working people who seek a better life, but retirement-aged 
people as well.
25
 This age group has the highest level of migration from 
Kazakhstan.
26
 Zhaksybayeva and Nurzhanova (2018) argue that economic factors 
driving migration from the country are more significant to urban dwellers.
27
 
Those from rural areas seeking to improve their lot would be likely first to go to 
cities in their countries before going abroad.
28
 A factor preventing retirement-
aged people from leaving would be to stay close to their families.
29
 Economic 
reforms that improve indicators in Kazakhstan would lead first to working-age 
people staying, and then as a result of their older relatives staying as well.
30
 
The literature seems to suggest that often harder-to-measure factors, like the 
configuration and availability of both local and transnational social networks, as 
well as the social, political, and economic incentives offered by public policy, can 
be definitive for those seeking a better life through migration choices. 
  
 
Research 
 
The first decade of independence saw an extremely high migration rate 
from Kazakhstan, a result of economic and sociopolitical upheaval. Around 2.7 
million people in total left the country during this time, or around 225,000 per 
annum on average. More than 60% of these were working-age people, 
                                               
24  Claire Naiditch, Agnès Tomini and Christian Ben Lakhdar, “Remittances and incentive to 
migrate: An epidemic approach of migration,” Handbook of International Economics, 
Elsevier, no 4 (2015): 118-135.  
25  Charles Longino and Don Bradley, “A first look at retirement migration trends in 2000,” 
The Gerontologist, no 43 (2003): 904–907; Becker, Musabek, Seitenova and Urzhumova, 
“The migration response.” 
26  Longino, “A first look at retirement migration trends in 2000,” 904–907. 
27  Zhaksybayeva and Nurzhanova, “The Migration Response” 
28  Alisher Aldashev and Barbara Dietz, “Economic and spatial determinants of interregional 
migration in Kazakhstan,”  Economic Systems, no 3 (2014): 379-396. 
29  Becker, Musabek, Seitenova and Urzhumova, “The migration response.” 
30  Gulnur Rakhmatullina, “Diversification of economy of Kazakhstan,” Journal 
KAZENERGY, no 4 (2012): 1–9.  
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disproportionately higher-educated and constituting a brain drain from 
Kazakhstan.
31
 
Brain drain in Kazakhstan is not considered in the context of ethnic 
groups but more in regard to immigrants’ professional qualifications. The 
country has been anxious about the amount of talent crossing the borders. 
Moreover, ethnic considerations, except those related to ethnic repatriates, have 
not been involved in Kazakhstan’s migration policy. Yet it remains a fact that 
those who are currently crossing the border are generally Russians. In 2019, 
34.2 thousand people left Kazakhstan, and 8 thousand arrived. It is most often 
Russians who leave the country, and Kazakhs who arrive in Kazakhstan.
32
 The 
proportion of ethnic Kazakhs continues to grow, amounting now to 58.9%, 
while Russian – 25.9%, Ukrainians – 2.9%, Uzbeks – 2,8%, Uighur, Tatar and 
German - 1.5% each, and other groups 4.3%. There are around 130 ethnic 
groups living in Kazakhstan.
33
 
What measures have been taken by the state to alleviate the negative 
repercussions related to the net negative migration in the Republic of Kazakhstan? 
First, the focus of the Migration Policy Program of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for the years 2001-2010 was to encourage and support the 
immigration of ethnic Kazakhs who mainly resided in China, Mongolia, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Based on the law “On 
Migration”, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan annually approves the 
immigration quota for ethnic Kazakhs living abroad who want to move to their 
historical homeland and are waiting for permission. Between 1991 and 2020, 
313,256 families received returnee status. In 2019, 17,661 ethnic Kazakhs or 
9,993 families returned to their historical homeland. Most of the returnees came 
from China - 41.5% (7,326 people), Uzbekistan - 40.1% (7,074 people), 
Turkmenistan - 6.5% (1,152 people), Mongolia - 6.2% (1,095 people), Russia - 
1.8% (313 people), and 3.9% (701 people) from other countries.
34
 
Secondly, within the framework of the implementation of Phase 1 
(2001-2005) of the Sectoral Program of Migration Policy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for 2001-2010, centers for the adaptation and integration of 
repatriates (ethnic Kazakhs) were established. The centers provide legal and 
psychological assistance to returnees, as well as employment and vocational 
training, and language courses. Thirdly, the Government of Kazakhstan has 
                                               
31  “Documents and Statistics,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
32  “Mostly Russians are leaving Kazakhstan,” EurAsia Daily,  January 22, 2020, 
https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2020/01/22/uezzhayut-iz-kazahstana-v-osnovnom-russkie. 
33  “About Kazakhstan Culture. Ethnic Groups,” Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 
Washington DC,  accessed March 15, 2020, https://kazakhembus.com/about-
kazakhstan/culture/ethnic-groups. 
34  “Over 17.6 thousand oralmans arrived in Kazakhstan in 2019,” Forbs.Kz,  January 23, 
2020, https://forbes.kz/news/2020/01/23/newsid_217371. 
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developed mechanisms of social support, including the purchase of housing on 
a return basis and grants for the education of their children. Thus, a family 
consisting of 5 people could receive a one-time allowance of 833 thousand 
tenge (approximately 5,866 US dollars) to purchase housing and to reimburse 
family relocation expenses. 
To collect information on labor migration and the registration of foreign 
citizens, as well as related processes, a single electronic information system 
“Berkut” was deployed. The system, implemented at Centers for Adaptation 
and Integration of Repatriates, is available to center officials and integrates 
information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Border Service of the 
National Security Committee, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
The measures taken contributed to the effective implementation of 
migration policy in Kazakhstan. In 2004, for the first time, there was a net 
positive balance of migration. 
In turn, the educational and professional level of repatriates has been 
lower than that of the indigenous population, which has had a negative impact 
on the quality of the labor market. Thus, among the repatriates of working age 
who arrived in Kazakhstan from 1991 to June 1, 2013, in terms of education, 
8.6% had higher education, 20.6% – secondary special education, and 70.8% – 
general secondary education, or no education at all.
35
 
In addition, repatriates tended to settle in the southern and western regions of 
the country. This situation had a negative impact on the territorial distribution of 
labor resources in the country and caused social tensions in some regions. 
In order to reduce the negative consequences of migration processes and 
to preserve and develop the national identity and security of the country by 
minimizing illegal and selective migration, the Concept of Migration Policy of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2007-2015 was adopted in 2007. 
The Concept presents the results of an analysis of the previous Program 
of Migration Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan over its 2001-2010 
implementation, which revealed the low migration attractiveness of 
Kazakhstan in comparison with other countries.
36
   
                                               
35  “About the complex plan for the solution of problems of migration, strengthening of 
control of migratory flows from the neighboring States, creation of favorable conditions 
for domestic qualified personnel not to allow their excessive outflow on the foreign labor 
markets for 2014-2016,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
No. 1371 dated December 15, 2013,  https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
36  “Concept of Migration Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2007-2015,” Ministry of 
Labor and Social Protection of Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Decree of 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 399 dated August 28, 2007, 
https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
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In this case, the mechanisms that should stimulate the influx of in-
demand professional and highly qualified specialists did not work. The system 
of labor migration was not effective enough, impacting the illegal residence of 
low-skilled foreign citizens in Kazakhstan, the prosperity of the shadow labor 
market, and a reduction of tax revenues to the budget. In addition, this 
situation led to the spontaneous resettlement of the migrating population, 
cases of illegal seizure of land for housing construction, and the unregulated 
resettlement of rural populations in the cities, especially in Astana (now Nur-
Sultan) and Almaty. 
The state program “Nurly Kosh” for 2009-2011 was adopted in 2008 for 
the planned resettlement and effective assistance of returnees.
37
 Within the 
framework of the program, internal and external migration processes were 
reoriented to concentrate labor resources in economically promising areas, 
support cities, and favor conservation in natural and climatic zones. The 
planned resettlement of returnees was meant to help them quickly adapt and 
better integrate into the labor market. It planned to resettle ethnic Kazakh 
75,000 families who were able to take advantage of the program. At the same 
time, a special quota for 1.6% of the economically active population of the 
country was established to attract high-skilled migrants. 
Three macro zones were identified in Kazakhstan for the resettlement of 
the population in accordance with the program “Nurly Kosh”: 
1) North zone – Akmola, Aktobe, East Kazakhstan, West Kazakhstan, 
Kostanay, Pavlodar and North Kazakhstan; 
2) South zone – Atyrau, Mangistau, Kyzylorda and Karaganda; 
3) Central zone – Astana, Almaty, South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl, and 
Almaty regions. 
In total, 197,795.6 million tenge (approximately 1318.6 million US 
dollars) were allocated for the implementation of the program in 2009-2011. At 
the same time, from the national budget in 2009 – 17,551.5 million tenge 
(approximately 1.17 million US dollars), in 2010 – 85,267.3 million tenge 
(approximately 0.6 million US dollars), and in 2011 – 76,737.7 million tenge 
(approximately 0.52 million US dollars) were allocated for the program 
implementation. From local budgets in 2009 - 25.8 million tenge 
(approximately 0.17 million US dollars), in 2010 – 5.208.9 million tenge 
(approximately 0.04 million US dollars), in 2011 - 4.946.6 million tenge 
(approximately 0.03 million US dollars), as well as from other sources: in 2009 
- 7.207.2 million tenge (approximately 0.05 million US dollars), and in 2010 - 
                                               
37  “State Program Nurly Kosh,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, dated 
December 1, 2008, https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
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850.6 million tenge (approximately 1.17 million US dollars) assigned for the 
program.
38
  
As an example of the effectiveness of state support measures, we can 
consider a pilot project for the construction of preferential housing for returnees 
in the village “Asar” of South Kazakhstan. At the same time, repatriates created 
a construction company and built brick and cement plants. In addition, as part 
of the program “Nurly Kosh” in Aktau, a temporary residence for repatriates 
was built. Within six months, having a residence permit, they could receive a 
number of the social benefits provided for returnees.  
Despite the measures taken, the total number of immigrants under the 
quota in 2009 amounted to 0.43% of the economically active population of the 
country, which is almost 4 times less than the established quota. At the same 
time, the number of undocumented immigrants began to grow in Kazakhstan. 
These migrants mainly found work in the construction and agriculture sectors.  
In our opinion, the main factors contributing to illegal labor migration 
were high rates of economic growth, political and social stability in the 
country, a liberal migration policy, geopolitical location, and visa-free 
entrance regimes within the CIS countries. Another reason may be the 
existence of transnational and “shadow” public structures focused on illegal 
migrants, as well as corruption among employees of responsible bodies and 
“open” borders with neighboring countries. The migration legislation has 
significant gaps in the regulation of the procedure for the forced expulsion of 
violators, which puts migration police in a difficult position and allows a 
foreigner to stay in Kazakhstan for months, despite violations of the law. These 
assumptions are confirmed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, 
moreover, citizens of other countries, such as Afghanistan, try to obtain the 
status of Kazakh-returnees. In addition, citizens of Bangladesh and Afghanistan 
use the territory of Kazakhstan to enter Europe and settle there for permanent 
residence.
39
 The flow of illegal migration in Kazakhstan is also associated with 
drug trafficking, extremism, and human trafficking.
40
 
Within the framework of the adopted Concept of Migration Policy of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017-2021, three strategies for the effective 
management of migration processes were developed. The first strategy was 
aimed at attracting foreign labor to the largest sectors of the economy to provide 
a short-term economic effect. The purpose of the second strategy was to create 
                                               
38  “State Program Nurly Kosh,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, dated 
December 1, 2008, https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
39  “Kazakhstan is trying to protect itself from illegal migrants,” Forbes.Kz, April 16, 2018, 
https://forbes.kz//process/resources/kazahstan_pyitaetsya_zaschititsya_ot_nelegalnyih_mi
grantov/. 
40  “Kazakhstan is trying to protect,” Forbes.Kz. 
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liberal conditions for attracting qualified foreign specialists in the implementation 
of long-term projects aimed at achieving results from the introduction of 
innovations and growing the innovation economy, the development of human 
capital, and improving the competitiveness of the economy. The third strategy was 
of a national scale and aimed at improving the skills of domestic specialists through 
the development of a national qualifications framework, modernization of the 
education system, training, and retraining.
41
 
Thus, in order to attract highly qualified foreign labor, employers pay 
fees for the employee, the rate of which depends on the industry and the level of 
qualification of employees. The higher the qualification level, the lower the fee 
rate. Therefore, it is beneficial for the employer to attract qualified specialists. 
In addition, highly qualified specialists have the right to stay in Kazakhstan and 
find a job, if their profession and industry are identified as a priority. 
Despite several measures taken by the state to create favorable conditions for 
qualified domestic personnel and attract relevant foreign specialists, there is a 
demographic imbalance in the country. Thus, for the period from 2015 to 2018, net 
migration amounted from 13.5 thousand to 30 thousand people, respectively. 
In order to identify the reasons for the attractiveness of Kazakhstan for 
migrants, this study further analyzes the economic indicators among countries 
whose citizens most arrive in Kazakhstan for working purposes. 
As can be seen in Table 1, for the period from 2013 to 2017 in 
Kazakhstan there is an increase in the negative balance in the international 
migration flow. Therefore, if in 2013 the number of people leaving the country 
exceeded the number of people entering by 2,234 people, in 2017 it exceeded 
by 22,426 people, that is, almost 10 times. The negative trend was due to the 
growth of immigration to Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries by 1.75 
times, and due to a decrease of 2.61 times the positive balance of immigration 
of people from other countries.
42
 
Destination countries for the people of Kazakhstan are graphically 
represented in Table 2. Thus, among the EAEU countries, the migration of 
people to Russia and Belarus exceeds their immigration to Kazakhstan. Among 
other countries, the largest number of people come to Kazakhstan from 
Uzbekistan and China and go to Germany and the United States.  
Meanwhile, the number of migrants from other countries living in 
Kazakhstan has remained more stable. By a large plurality, the migrants 
currently living in Kazakhstan originate from Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
                                               
41  “About the approval of the Concept of migration policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 
2017-2021 and the action Plan for implementation of the Concept of migration policy of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017-2021,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of 
Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Decree of the Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, #602 dated September 29, 2017,  https://www.enbek.gov.kz. 
42  Eurasian Economic Commission’s Statistical Yearbook. – М., 2018, 40. 
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While the balance of migration is negative, these three categories of migrants 
have not only maintained their large quantity within Kazakhstan, but their 
numbers have shown moderate gains over the past decade. 
According to the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan Statistics, in 
2017 the largest number of people went to the EAEU countries, including 
Russia (32,874 people) and Belarus (289 people). Among other countries, 
emigration to Germany amounted to 2,966 people, and to the US – 285 
people.
43
 Migration flows consisted mainly of repatriated Russians, Belarusians, 
Ukrainians, and Germans. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the number of migrants leaving for Russia is 
growing significantly. The outflow of the population is observed mainly in the 
border regions with Russia. Among the reasons for the emigration are higher 
wages, pension benefits, free education, and medical services, as well as 
perceptions of political stability in the country. For further evidence of this, we 
will conduct a comparative analysis of the basic indicators of the socio-
economic levels of the EAEU member states. 
In 2018, the amount of money sent through international money transfer 
systems amounted to 601,815.5 million tenge or 1745.7 million USD (the 
average dollar exchange rate in 2018 amounted to 344.71 tenge), and the 
volume of received transfers – 361 966.1 million tenge or 1050.1 million USD. 
Starkly, the outflow of funds from Kazakhstan was 60% higher than its inflow. 
Money transfers to Kazakhstan were carried out mainly in two currencies: US 
dollars, which accounted for 58.2% of the total amount of money transfers, and 
the Russian ruble, which accounted for 28.1% (n.d.). 
Table 3 shows data on the number of money transfers through 
international money transfer systems in the context of countries. Almost 80% of 
transactions are to 4 countries from Kazakhstan, including Russia (42.0%), 
Uzbekistan (14.1%), Turkey (11.8%), and Kyrgyzstan (11.3%). In terms of 
countries from which funds are transferred to Kazakhstan, the largest remitter is 
Russia (54.3%), the second, South Korea (18.4%), the third, Uzbekistan, and 
finally Kyrgyzstan (8%). 
The main generalizing indicator characterizing the standard of living of 
the population is cash income, part of which is spent on current consumption 
and the rest on savings. 
Table 4 presents data for 2013-2017, showing that in Russia, per capita 
income is 2.1 times higher than in Kazakhstan. For all countries, there is a 
considerable deterioration in this indicator which occurred due to the relatively 
low prices for energy and other commodities, as well as weak growth of the 
global economy and trade. 
                                               
43  Demographic Yearbook of Kazakhstan. - Astana, 2018, 237. 
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The existing data points out that in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, per capita 
income per month is much lower compared with other EAEU countries. 
Therefore, this study focuses on the average per capita income of households in 
the EAEU countries. 
As can be seen from Table 5, this figure in Kazakhstan is 3.2 times lower 
than in Russia, but 2 times more than in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, in 2017 
in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, the rate of per capita cash income in real 
terms decreased compared to 2016. But in Kyrgyzstan, it increased by almost 
8%, a marked difference and potential impetus for immigration. 
The statistics of the Eurasian Economic Commission show that the average 
per capita income of households is mainly formed by wages and pensions.
44
 
In 2017, in Kazakhstan, the share of wages and pensions in the structure 
of this indicator was 65.6% and 16.4%, respectively. In Russia – 70.2% and 
16.1%, in Belarus – 61.6% and 25.9%, in Armenia – 55.1% and 15.2%, and in 
Kyrgyzstan – 42.9% and 15.7%. 
As can be seen from Table 6, in 2017, the lowest average monthly 
nominal salary was $228 in Kyrgyzstan and the highest salary was $671 in 
Russia. If we consider the relative changes, in Kazakhstan this figure decreased 
by 35.4% over the last five years.  Salaries are, on average, 45% lower than 
those in Russia.
45
 
The main factors that influenced the decrease in the average monthly wage 
are the slowing national economic growth, the devaluation of the tenge, and the 
introduction of a freely floating exchange rate by the National Bank of Kazakhstan. 
In the structure of the average per capita income of the population, the 
first place among social payments is the pension. In 2017, the average pension 
in Kazakhstan and Belarus amounted to $156, which is less than 1.5 times that 
of Russia. However, in comparison with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, this figure is 
almost 2 times more (see Table 7). 
The average pension in 2017 was less than half of the average wage 
working in all member states of the EAEU and exceeded the subsistence 
minimum of a pensioner in Belarus (as of December 2017) – 2.1 times, 
Kazakhstan – 2.3 times, Kyrgyzstan – 1.3 times, and in Russia – 1.6 times.
46
 
Regarding the monetary income of the population, it is impossible to ignore 
such an important indicator as consumer spending aimed at purchasing food, 
non-food products, alcoholic beverages, and services. 
According to Table 8, in 2017 the real level of consumer spending in 
Kazakhstan decreased by 99.6% compared to 2016. At the same time, its 
                                               
44  “About the standard of living of the population of EAEU in 2017,” Eurasian Economic 
Commission, February 15, 2019, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/.  
45  Statistical Yearbook of the EAEU. – М., 2018. 60. 
46  “About the standard of living,” Eurasian Economic Commission. 
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absolute size is more than 2 times lower than in Russia, but almost 3 times 
higher than in Kyrgyzstan.  
One of the indicators of the investment attractiveness of certain types of 
economic activity is the employer's labor costs. Labor costs in terms of US 
dollars in 2017 amounted to $274 in Kyrgyzstan, $406 in Armenia, $505 in 
Kazakhstan, $544 in Belarus in 2016, and $1,027 in Russia
47
 (Table 9). 
Analysis of the structure of labor costs for 2017 showed that in all 
countries the overall structure of consumer spending is dominated by wages. 
Table 10 shows that social spending in Kazakhstan is significantly lower 
than in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Thus, in comparison with Belarus – 
almost 5.5 times, Russia – 5 times, and Kyrgyzstan – 3 times. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Following the economic difficulties post-independence, Kazakhstan has 
built trade and capital ties to the world. One example of these ties is the 
Eurasian Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. 
Increasing opportunities have led to increased interest in migration to 
Kazakhstan, particularly for residents of Central Asia who can benefit from a 
visa-free regime. However, at this time legal employment-based migration is 
limited to highly skilled labor and household employees. Those participants in 
low-skilled labor, such as constructions or agriculture, exist outside of legal 
frameworks and in tenuous situations where their rights are not always 
respected. Such undocumented workers in Kazakhstan number anywhere from 
300,000 to 1.5 million over the last few years.
48
 (Ministry of Labor, 2018). 
In the meantime, since 2013, Kazakhstan has experienced net negative 
migration without any indication of abating (Table 1). Between 2013 and 2017 
the number of people leaving the country exceeded the number of people 
arriving in the country tenfold.  This trend occurred due to the growth of 
immigration to the EAEU countries (by 1.75 times), as well as a decrease of 
immigration from other countries (around 2.61 times).  
However, despite a bout of acute economic stagnation caused by the 
Russian economic crisis and falling energy prices, the most voluminous migrant 
stocks in Kazakhstan have remained resilient. The largest contributors to 
Kazakhstan's migrant stock have maintained and expanded their volume. Even 
though the data is not sufficient to substantiate a causal effect, it is worth noting 
that the largest migrant stocks in Kazakhstan are responsible for a large portion 
                                               
47  Ibid.  
48  “Documents and Statistics,” Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
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of the remittances flowing out of the country: 56% of all remittances from 
Kazakhstan are received in Russia and Uzbekistan (Table 3).  
Perhaps part of the answer to addressing Kazakhstan's net negative 
migration lies in the stability of these migrant stocks: what economic and social 
factors are contributing to the maintenance and growth of these populations? 
Part of the answer must be remittance flows, as they exist as not only as an 
economic means but as a social signal. Further, what kind of regional workforce 
strategy can be negotiated not only between CIS nations, but also Russia? Any 
such plan, to gain the attention of each national government, would have to 
account for the interests of each economy in terms of actual competition 
between nations for workers. The authors believe that the setting of a regional 
workforce policy is not necessarily a zero-sum game and that agreements can be 
developed that complement the growing sectors of each CIS nation. 
Simultaneously, such a policy must address the political barriers to negotiating 
such an agreement. The Post-Soviet project for CIS nations, after all, is not only 
one of industry building and economic liberalization, but it is also tied up in the 
politics of national identity development and reification that are confirmed in 
the various CIS agreements.  
The character and volume of migrant flows and stocks depend on 
numerous social, economic, and political factors. Future policy concepts must 
address each of these considerations. Certainly, the decline of both real and 
nominal wages (see Table 6) is a substantial factor accounting for migration 
outflows; it is plain that a robust, national economic development plan with 
targeted market interventions is necessary to increase wages. From the currently 
available data, it is challenging to say whether nominal wages have hit their 
bottom or not. While concern for the market competitiveness of Kazakhstan’s 
wages vis-a-vis its neighbors is warranted, further research is necessary to better 
understand how potential migrant stocks in neighboring nations assess the 
economic conditions in Kazakhstan.  
Such an analysis must focus on the social networks that deliver both 
remittances and economic perceptions throughout the region. At the very least, 
it is probable that a focus on improving the lived conditions of current migrant 
stocks in Kazakhstan will facilitate further migration, and at least in part will 
address the issues surrounding the current net negative migration balance. 
Concurrently, an evaluation of the implementation of the ethnic Kazakh 
repatriation policy is timely, with a focus on the efficacy of the repatriation 
policy in the socio-economic integration of repatriates and their retention. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Thus, over the past twenty years, despite the adopted Programs and 
Concepts in the field of migration policy in Kazakhstan, there have been no 
qualitative changes in migration processes. The net migration deficit is growing, 
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the brain drain problem is not decreasing, and the number of low-skilled 
immigrants is growing.  
In addition, a comparative analysis of the main socio-economic factors of 
the EAEU member states showed that in Russia, the average per capita income 
is much higher than in Kazakhstan (by 2.1 times higher). 
This fact plainly explains why the population emigrates to Russia and why 
the number remains high. An accurate mirror image, but with a negative effect, is 
observed with the influx of low-skilled labor from Kyrgyzstan, as the level of socio-
economic development in Kazakhstan is comparatively much higher. 
Solving these problems requires a systematic approach, as migration 
policy should be consistent with the country's social and economic policies, as 
well as with international migration policy. In our view, Kazakhstan should 
harmonize state migration policy programs with the U.N. Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). In this regard, the position of the international 
organization for migration, which offered its vision of the migration component 
in the complex tasks of SDGs, is interesting. For each of the 17 SDG goals, 
proposals are made on the relevance of migration. For example, recognizing and 
promoting the links between migration and poverty reduction for migrants 
through increased income, access to housing, health care, and education. 
Recognizing and increasing the contribution of migrants to the community and 
to the country, the positive impact on labor markets, and productivity. The 
essence of harmonizing the state migration policy programs with SDGs is not in 
listing all the goals of SDGs, it is essentially covering the migration component. 
The main thing is that in the formation of migration policy in the country, it is 
necessary to involve all stakeholders into the decision-making process, realizing 
that the Post-Soviet legacy with a centralized top-down approach is still active 
and must be addressed in current days. Stakeholders are experts from various 
spheres of state policy and public organizations, ready to support migrants and 
their social adaptation, returnees themselves, and international organizations. 
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Annexes 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Central Asian Countries 
Source: “Map of Kazakhstan and surrounding countries. Political Map of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan,” Kazakh Archives, accessed March 15, 2020,  http://www.kazarchives.kz/ 
Economy/map-of-kazakhstan-and-surrounding-countries 
 
 
Table 1. Balance of international migration (people) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Change 
2017/2013, in % 
Kazakhstan -2234 -11265 -13026 -20594 -22426 10 times 
including:       
with EAEU 
countries 
-16063 -20670 -21479 -26253 -28158 1.75 times 
with other 
countries 
15784 8508 8013 5108 6028 (-) 2.61 times 
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission’s Statistical Yearbook. – М., 2018.40 
 
Table 2. Balance of external migration by country (people) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
Kazakhstan 
-2234 -11265 -13026 -20594 -22426 
EAEU 
countries 
     
Armenia 124 89 197 99 69 
Belarus -953 -1404 -430 -244 -166 
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Kyrgyzstan 1327 793 531 446 467 
Russia -16561 -20148 -21777 -26554 -28528 
other 
countries 
     
USA -108 -167 -201 -192 -184 
Germany -1037 -2003 -1974 -2465 -2741 
Uzbekistan 12506 8481 7228 4820 4775 
China 2049 596 1217 2069 2953 
Source: Demographic Yearbook of Kazakhstan. - Astana, 2018. 237. 
 
Table 3. Cross-border money transfers December 2018 
 
Country 
Sent abroad  
Country 
Received from abroad 
Amount, 
tenge, 
million 
Share of 
total 
amounts, % 
Amount, 
tenge, million 
Share of 
total 
amounts, 
% 
Russia 20 265.3 42.0% Russia 15 168.1  45.3% 
Uzbekist
an 
6805.9 14.1% Uzbekistan 2 666.1  8.0% 
Turkey 5 704.4  11.8% Turkey 618.6  1.8% 
Kyrgyzst
an 
5 452.4  11.3% Kyrgyzstan 2 687.6  8.0% 
China 3 511.0  7.3% South Korea 6 171.7  18.4% 
Azerbaij
an 
1 047.7  2.2% USA 1 263.2  3.8% 
Ukraine 930.2 19% Ukraine 232.5  0.7% 
Tajikista
n 
778.9 1.6% Tajikistan 548.4  1.6% 
Armenia 730.6 1.5% Germany 1 089.4  3.3% 
Georgia 573.8 1.2% UAE 300.7  0.9% 
Other 2 495.5 5.2% Other 2 769.9  8.3% 
TOTAL 48 295.9 100.0% TOTAL 33 516.0  100.0% 
Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data from the 
National Bank of Kazakhstan. 
 
Table 4. Cash income per capita (per month) in USD 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Belarus  434  451  304  257  291  
Kazakhstan  371  348  304  224  255  
Russia 815  731  502  460  540  
Source: Eurasian Economic Commission’s Statistical Yearbook. – М., 2018, 40. 
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Table 5. Per capita household cash income in 2017 
 Unit of National 
Currency 
USD In % to 2016  
Nominal Real 
Armenia 58474 121  
 
103.4 102.4 
Belarus 390  202 105.7 99.6 
Kazakhstan 47562  146 107.0 99.6 
Kyrgyzstan 4739   69 111.3 107.9 
Russia 26723  468 100.6 97.1 
Source: “About the standard of living of the population of EAEU in 2017,” Eurasian 
Economic Commission, February 15, 2019, http://www.eurasiancommission.org. 
 
Table 6. Average monthly nominal wage USD 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Changes 
from 2017 
to 2013, in 
% 
Armenia 358   
 
381   
 
359 363  
 
368 102.7 
Belarus 564      
 
590 413 361 426 75.5 
Kazakhstan 717       
 
675 568 418 463 64.6 
Kyrgyzstan 234      
 
229 209 212 228 97.4 
Russia 936   
 
856 561 549 671 71.7 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the EAEU. – М., 2018, 60. 
 
Table 7. Average pension in 2017 
 Unit of national 
currency 
USD In % in 2016 
Nominal Real 
Armenia 40634      84  
 
100.4 99.5 
Belarus 314 156 110.4 104.1 
Kazakhstan 50850 156 110.5 102.9 
Kyrgyzstan 5578 81 102.7 99.5 
Russia 13304 228 104.3 100.6 
Source: “About the standard of living of the population of EAEU in 2017,” Eurasian 
Economic Commission, February 15, 2019, http://www.eurasiancommission.org. 
 
 
Table 8. Household consumption expenditure in 2017 
 Unit of 
national 
currency 
USD In % in 2016 
Nominal Real 
Armenia  44162 91  
 
103.4 102.4 
Belarus 319  165 105.7 99.6 
Kazakhstan 42891  132 107.0 99.6 
Kyrgyzstan 2974   43 111.3 107.9 
Russia 16770  287 100.6 97.1 
Source: “About the standard of living of the population of EAEU in 2017,” Eurasian Economic 
Commission, February 15, 2019, http://www.eurasiancommission.org. 
 
Affecting International Migration Trends through a Multi-Faceted Policy 243 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XX no. 2  2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Cost of labor USD 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Armenia  389  413  389  394  406  
Belarus  …  885  …  544  …  
Kazakhstan  797  736  621  451  505  
Kyrgyzstan  283  289  250  256  274  
Russia 1 442  …  …  …  1 027  
Source: “About the standard of living of the population of EAEU in 2017,” Eurasian Economic 
Commission, February 15, 2019, http://www.eurasiancommission.org. 
 
Table 10. Structure of labor costs in % 
 
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia 
Structure of total cost 100 100 100 100 100 
Salary 97 71.8 86.6 83 75 
Special costs 0.9 25.1 4.5 13.7 22.1 
Other costs 1.5  2.2  1.3  3.0  2.2  
Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data  
 
 
 
 
